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Abstract
The newspaper industry is a two-sided market: the readers market
and the advertising market are closely linked by inter-market network
externalities. We estimate market power in the Italian newspaper industry
by building a structural model which encompasses a demand estimation
for di⁄erentiated products on both sides of the market and where pro￿t
maximization by the publishing ￿rms takes into account the interactions
between them. The question that we address is whether the observed
price pattern is consistent with pro￿t-maximizing behavior by competing
￿rms or is instead driven by some form of (tacit or explicit) coordinated
practice.
Keywords: demand estimation, market power, two-sided markets, news-
papers, di⁄erentiated products.
JEL codes: L11, L40, L82, C33
￿We are grateful to Massimo Motta and Andrea Ichino for their advice and comments.
We also thank Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Jean-Charles Rochet, Elmer Sterken, Frank Vella,
Reinhilde Veugelers and participants to the International Industrial Organization Conference
2005 (Atlanta), the EC2 Conference 2004 (Marseille), the Conference on Media Regulation
(Toulouse), and the CIDE Conference (Venice) for useful conversations and suggestions. Elena
Argentesi acknowledges ￿nancial support from the IDEI (Toulouse) through a RTN grant.
yUniversity of Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126
Bologna (Italy). Tel. +39 051 2098661. Fax +39 051 2098040. Email: argen-
tesi@economia.unibo.it.
zEuropean University Institute and University of Siena. Address: European University
Institute, via della Piazzuola 43, 50133 Firenze (Italy). Email: lapo.￿listrucchi@iue.it
1
EUI WP ECO 2005/71 Introduction
In the last few years there has been a renewed interest for media markets in
economics. With deregulation in the ￿ 80s and then globalization in the ￿ 90s, we
have witnessed a surge in mergers and cross-media ownership, leading to higher
media concentration almost everywhere in the world. Whereas other disciplines
have dealt with the issue of pluralism and political economy has analyzed polit-
ical in￿ uence on media ownership and media in￿ uence in the electoral process,
industrial organization and competition policy have been mainly interested in
modelling the nature of the various media markets, explaining the economic ra-
tionale for concentration and assessing the welfare e⁄ects of observed mergers.
One of the key issues is then the extent to which the various media enjoy
market power. A model aiming at studying the structure of competition in the
newspaper market must take into account the two-sided nature of this market.
Indeed, besides the readers market there is also a market for advertising space,
and the two are closely linked by inter-market network externalities. In other
words, the willingness to pay of advertisers depends on the size (and sometimes
on the composition) of the readership, as well as readers demand might be a
function also of the amount of advertising. The direction of the former exter-
nality is clear-cut: the main reason why advertisers purchase advertising slots
is to reach an audience, and therefore the bigger the readership the higher their
willingness to pay for them. On the other hand, although advertising volume
might have an impact on readers demand for a newspaper, the direction of the
network e⁄ect that goes from advertising quantities to readers demand is not
unambiguously clear: depending on the type of advertising (informative or per-
suasive), readers may have di⁄erent perceptions of it, and di⁄erent degrees of
ad-nuisance can well coexist. Therefore we focus on the ￿rst type of externality,
and leave aside the e⁄ect of advertising on readers￿demand, which for the class
of newspapers we consider in our analysis does not seem to be very strong.
One implication that can be drawn from the growing body of literature
on two-sided markets, initiated by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004), Caillaud
and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2004), is that, as pointed out by Evans
(2003), in two-sided industries ￿market de￿nition and market power analyses
that focus on a single side will lead to analytical errors￿ . Because of demand
interactions between the two sides of the market, the standard markup formula
does not hold. In practice, it is usually the case that one side of the market
subsidizes the other side, which might end up paying a price below marginal
cost. Examples of platforms that do not charge one side are Internet portals,
commercial televisions, and the free press.
In order to measure market power, it is then necessary to compute price-
cost margins taking into account the two-sided nature of this market. If so,
estimating price elasticities of demand is only a ￿rst step: in this context, ￿nd-
ing a low elasticity of demand would not be enough to conclude that newspapers
publishers enjoy a high degree of market power. A pro￿t maximizing publisher
selling newspapers has to take into account that it is actually operating in two
markets linked by an externality, possibly a two-way one. In general, its optimal
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for daily newspapers with respect to cover price, the elasticity of advertising de-
mand with respect to advertising prices and the elasticity of advertising demand
with respect to newspaper circulation. A fourth one might also turn out to be
relevant: the elasticity of demand for newspapers with respect to the quantity
of advertising on the newspaper. Therefore in order to understand the price
structure in this market and to determine the ￿true￿margins, we have to build
an empirical model which encompasses a demand estimation of both sides of
the market and where pro￿t maximization by the publishing ￿rms takes into
account the interactions between them.
Our econometric model consists of two (inter-related) demand equations, one
for each side of the market, and one condition for pro￿t maximization. Given
that the objective of the paper is to shed light on the pricing strategies and on
the competitive structure of this market, we formulate two alternative conjec-
tures, namely that newspaper ￿rms compete in an oligopolistic setting, or that
￿rms jointly maximize pro￿ts (in a setting of di⁄erentiated products). After
estimating the parameters of the demand functions, we then compute the esti-
mated markups under the two alternative hypotheses and then compare them
with the observed markup in order to assess which model of competition better
explains reality. This strategy is commonly used for market power estimation
when data on price-cost margins are available, see for example Nevo (2001).1
We perform this analysis on an original dataset which pools together data
coming from the Accertamenti Di⁄usione Stampa (ADS), the Federazione Ital-
iana Editori Giornali (FIEG), Audipress, and additional information that we
have collected from other sources.2 ADS data contain information on newspa-
per circulation (monthly average daily sales and printed copies). FIEG collects
data on accounting balances of publishing ￿rms, in particular information on
revenues from sales and advertising and aggregate costs. Survey data on readers￿
characteristics for each newspaper are published by Audipress. For the purpose
of this paper, we use a panel of the four biggest national newspapers in Italy
from 1976 to 2003.
There are two main reasons why one may want to perform an empirical study
in this market. The ￿rst is that despite the growing body of theoretical literature
on competition and pricing in two-sided markets, there is still little work on the
empirical implications of these theories, especially for media markets. In the
next section we discuss some recent contributions that conduct an empirical
analysis of the price structure in media markets, but do not explicitly address
the issue of market power as we do in our paper.
There is also another reason that makes the Italian newspaper market an
1In the absence of information on actual price-cost margins, an alternative way to evaluate
which model better ￿ts the data consists of using a Vuong test to select the best speci￿cation
(see Ivaldi and Verboven, 2003, or Verboven and Brenkers, 2002).
2We are grateful to Sibilla Guzzetti of ADS, Laura Ferrari of Audipress, Elena Olivetti
of Assocarta and Giovanni Mastrogiacomo of La Stampa for kindly providing us with the
data. The data of ADS, Audipress and FIEG are publicly accessible, but only recent years
are available on electronic support.
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tal agency, and it is only in 1988 that prices were liberalized. While prices
were uniform across newspapers and price changes very rare before the change
in the regulation, price liberalization does not seem to have had any strong
impact on price competition: prices have had a quite stable pattern and price
increases by the di⁄erent newspapers have always been quite simultaneous. It
is therefore interesting in this context to understand what is the pricing policy
adopted by newspapers, taking also into account the existence of the related
advertising market. In particular, the question that we address is whether the
observed pattern in newspaper prices is consistent with pro￿t-maximizing be-
havior by competing ￿rms or is instead driven by some form of (tacit or explicit)
coordinated practice.
After a brief discussion of the existing literature in the next section, in
Section 3 we give a general description of the newspaper market in Italy and
describe the sample of newspapers on which we carry on our analysis. Section
4 discusses the estimating model. We then provide a general overview of the
dataset and justify the choice of variables in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the
estimation results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to the growing body of literature on two-sided markets
and in media markets in particular. Recent empirical studies on two-sided
markets aim at quantifying network externalities and multi-homing in electronic
payments system industries (Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran, 2003; Borzekowski
and Kiser, 2003; Rysman, 2004).
Closer to our work are two recent papers by Kaiser (2004) and Kaiser and
Wright (2004), who present evidence from the German magazine industry. In
the ￿rst paper, Kaiser estimates a model for pro￿t maximization of German
women magazines and ￿nds that many magazines set prices below marginal
costs and that there are signi￿cant economies of scale in the production of these
magazines, which may justify mergers on e¢ ciency grounds rather than for
market power reasons.
Kaiser￿ s approach is very close to ours in that it models both sides of the
market and derives a condition for pro￿t-maximization. While readers￿demand
is estimated in a structural way with a nested logit model, advertising demand
is modelled with a behavioral equation for advertising rates: advertising rates
are assumed to be a speci￿c function of past circulation following a model of
adaptive expectations. Therefore the only choice variable for magazine pub-
lishers is cover price, which leads to only one markup formula. This markup
formula for cover price di⁄ers from the usual markup formula by a term that
represents markup deterioration due to advertising. In other words, the markup
deterioration term quanti￿es the e⁄ect of a change in cover prices on advertis-
ing revenues: an increase in cover price reduces readers￿demand, which in turn
reduces advertising revenues. This implies that optimal cover price is generally
4
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the link with the advertising market.
This result on the price structure is present also in our model. However,
with respect to Kaiser (2004) we model the advertising side in a more structural
way, by estimating a (logit) model for advertising demand as well as a model
for readers￿demand. We have therefore two choice variables (cover prices and
advertising prices) and two markup expressions, one for each side of the market.
The paper by Kaiser and Wright (2004) estimates an adapted version of
Armstrong (2004) model of competition in a two-sided market where magazines
compete in a Hotelling fashion and, similarly to Kaiser (2004) ￿nds that the
readers￿market is subsidized by advertising. The theoretical model on which the
estimation is built applies to a market where there are only two magazine outlets
competing in a Hotelling fashion on both markets. Two demand equations are
obtained and estimated. The estimated parameters are then plugged into the
two ￿rst-order conditions for pro￿t maximization. The structure of the price
margins resembles very much to Kaiser (2004)￿ s and ours: equilibrium cover
prices are discounted to re￿ ect the externality generated on the advertising
side.
Neither Kaiser (2004) nor Kaiser and Wright (2004) explicitly address mar-
ket power issues, which are instead the focus of our paper. Besides describing
and estimating this peculiar price structure, we aim at understanding the impli-
cations of the estimated margins for market power. By comparing the estimated
margins with the observed ones, we draw inferences about ￿rms￿behavior and
the strength of competition in this market.
In order to estimate the demand in the two markets, we make use of discrete
choice models of product di⁄erentiation, which are by now widely used in empir-
ical industrial organization. They all build on the seminal work by McFadden
(1973) on discrete choice models, but place particular emphasis on the work
with aggregate data, as these are the data most commonly observed in many
product markets. In addition, they usually try to link the random utility model
at the basis of consumer demand with models of the supply side of the market,
mainly models of product di⁄erentiation (Anderson et al, 1992). The more fre-
quently used are logit and nested logit. Recently, their limitations have been
outlined (Berry, 1994; Nevo, 2000), as they have been found to place restrictive
assumptions on patterns of substitution between products and therefore on both
marginal e⁄ects of price and price elasticities. Thus recent research often uses
also the more ￿ exible random coe¢ cients or mixed logit models (e.g. Berry &
al, 1995; Nevo, 2001, Petrin, 2002, McFadden and Train, 2000). Such a model
is more general and allows substitution between products to depend on product
characteristics through observable consumers demographics. However it is not
solvable analytically and requires to be estimated by simulation (Nevo, 2000).
So that logit or nested logit models not only o⁄er interesting benchmark cases
but are still widely used for their computational simplicity or when the implied
restrictions on price elasticities and marginal e⁄ects are not considered crucial
(Brenkers and Verboven, 2002; Kaiser, 2003). As we will argue below, logit
and particularly nested logit o⁄er a good analytical tool in our case, as long as
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can assume without too much bias that substitution takes place on the basis of
market shares. Were we to extend the number of newspapers taken into consid-
eration, we would at least need to compare results obtained by a nested logit
model with those deriving from mixed logit model.
Interestingly, a recent paper by Kaiser (2003) analyses the market for women￿ s
magazines in Germany using a framework very similar to the one we use for read-
ers￿demand estimation. His objective is to assess the e⁄ect of website provision
on magazine circulation. His estimates of price elasticity are not reported but
the estimated price coe¢ cient is much higher than ours, which re￿ ects the dif-
ferent nature of the product ￿women magazine￿ with respect to the product
￿daily newspaper￿ . He uses a panel of up to 42 magazines for up to 10 years
with yearly observations. As we will see, our data set is much richer. Although
we choose a much smaller sample of newspapers, our panel is longer in time and
we have monthly observations.
The pioneering works in the analysis of the market for newspapers are,
however, those by Corden (1952) and Reddaway (1963) who ￿rst recognized
and modelled the existence of externalities between circulation and advertising.
More recently Bucklin, Caves and Lo (1989) modelled the incentives towards
monopolization due to the particular features of a circulation industry and pre-
sented supporting econometric evidence from the US market. The estimated
price elasticity in their model is of the same order of magnitude than our es-
timates. Blair and Romano (1993) also analyzed the market in question as a
circulation industry and identi￿ed the issues arising in estimating price elastic-
ities in a circulation industry if its nature is not recognized. Chaudri (1998)
considers instead the market for newspapers as a dual market and analyses all
the three benchmark cases of monopoly, oligopoly and perfect competition, in
both the advertising and the newspapers market, deriving interesting results on
the relative e¢ ciency of these market structures, both when compared to each
other and to those of a non dual market. H￿ckner and Nyberg (2001) endoge-
nize market structure as determined by strategic interaction in the interrelated
markets of newspapers and advertising, whereas Gabszewicz et al. (2003) show
that, in a duopoly framework, readers feeling about advertising on the newspa-
pers in￿ uences price competition between newspaper publishers selling in the
two markets.
3 Daily newspapers in Italy
The Italian market for daily newspapers is quite a rich one. It is mainly com-
posed of quality newspapers though many of them are quite politically ori-
ented, if not directly owned by political parties or members of political parties.
Tabloids are in practice inexistent in the daily market and free daily newspapers
appeared only in 2000.
Although an exact market de￿nition is not the subject of this paper, we
can roughly identify, by content, the following traditional categories of daily
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economic newspapers; c) sport newspapers. A further distinction has always
been, of course, the one between local and national newspapers, with local
newspapers being quite a lot in number and enjoying a substantial share of
overall readers.34
It should be noticed however that both these classi￿cations are by no means
set once and for all. Some national newspapers were born with a strong re-
gional or even local characterization. Many of them have been adding local
pages through the years. Others chose agreements with local newspapers which
allowed the two to be sold together at a lower price. Furthermore there has
been a growing trend for newspapers of general information toward including
business and sport sections.
We carry out our analysis on the four main national generalist newspapers
which are commonly believed to be best substitutes to each other, namely Cor-
riere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa and Il Giornale.5 Together with
L￿ Avvenire, Il Giorno and Il Foglio they belong, according to FIEG, to the
group of national daily newspapers. In 2000 they alone accounted for more
than 90% of the sales of the group, while the group itself accounted for 35% of
overall sales of daily newspapers.
The series of monthly average daily printed copies for the four newspapers
considered are presented in Figure 1 in the Appendix. The two leading ones in
terms of circulation are Repubblica and Corriere della Sera, while La Stampa
has a lower market share and Il Giornale is well below La Stampa. Corriere della
Sera, founded in 1876, is, in the last few years, the one that sells more copies,
￿ercely competing with Repubblica, while La Stampa, which being founded in
1867 is the oldest, and has consistently lower sales in the period considered here.
It should also be taken into account that La Repubblica was born exactly in
January 1976. As a result the graph of its average daily sales follows the usual
S-shape well-known in the literature on product di⁄usion. Looking at the graphs
it is also possible to notice that a strong monthly seasonality a⁄ects the data.
The timing of the spikes which can be observed in Figure 1 in January 1989
for Corriere della Sera and in January 1987 for Repubblica coincide respectively
with Portfolio and Replay, two games of the lotto kind which could be played
only and simply by buying a copy of the newspaper (at the normal price).
A particular feature of the Italian newspaper market has always been the
weak price competition. For many years the price was regulated, and even
after price liberalization nominal price changes have been very rare and quite
simultaneous across newspapers (see Figure 2 in the Appendix).
3This is the classi￿ation adopted by the Italian competition authority in several occasions
(see for example the case 3354/95 Ballarino vs. Grandi Quotidiani).
4For a discussion on market de￿nition in printed media industries, see also Argentesi and
Ivaldi (2005).
5Other national newspapers which were or are politically-oriented (controlled directly or
indirectly by political parties) had in the past periods of very high circulation (e.g. L￿ Unit￿,
the newspaper of the left-wing party). Unfortunately, the political newspapers are not present
(at least not continuosly) in the ADS database.
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troduced and a limited variability of prices across newspapers has appeared.
Starting from the end of the Eighties, the practice of selling supplements and in-
serts together with newspapers has become increasingly widespread.6 Although
most bundling leaves the consumer free to buy the newspaper alone or together
with the bundle product (mixed bundling), so that the choice can be conceived
as that for two di⁄erent products, in the case of some supplements the reader
is forced to buy the supplement if he wants to read the newspaper and thus
forced to pay the higher price for the bundle and vice versa (pure bundling).7
The choice is then the choice for a single product with di⁄erent characteristics.
Given that each newspaper bundles the weekly magazine with the newspaper
in a di⁄erent weekday, this practice introduces a source of variability in prices
across newspapers and weekdays which, as argued below, can be exploited to
estimate the price elasticity of demand for daily newspapers in Italy.
The series of advertising volumes and nominal prices for the newspapers
considered are plotted in Figure 3 and 4 respectively (see Appendix).
4 A ￿supply-and-demand￿model
In this section we develop and estimate a model that captures the interaction
between the two sides of the market, namely the readers and the advertisers. In
particular, we estimate two demand models, one for the readers￿side and one for
the advertising side together with a model of the supply side. On the supply side,
newspaper publishers are assumed to maximize their pro￿ts on both markets.
We derive the pricing equation under two alternative assumptions, namely that
the market is (oligopolistically) competitive and that ￿rms jointly maximize
their pro￿ts,8 and then compare the estimated margins with a crude measure of
observed margins in order to determine what is the ￿true￿model. This allows us
to explore the issue of market power which has not been addressed in previous
papers on printed media industries.
4.1 The demand side
Since the demand is two-sided, we need to specify and estimate two demand
models, one for the advertising market and one for newspaper circulation.
We focus on the impact that circulation has on advertising demand rather
than on the impact of advertising quantities on readers￿demand. To simplify
things, we assume therefore that readers￿demand is independent of advertising.
We believe this is a plausible approximation of reality since readers may have
di⁄erent perceptions of advertising depending on the content (informative or
6For an analysis of the impact of weekly supplements on newspaper circulation, see Argen-
tesi (2004).
7This is the case of weekly magazines, which are bundled with the newspaper in a particular
weekday (di⁄erent for each newspaper).
8In the following of the paper the word ￿collusion￿ is used as a synonym of joint pro￿t
maximization.
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printed media, readers￿attitude towards advertising is not clear-cut: the general
ad-aversion that may apply to other media might be mitigated by the fact that
advertising on newspapers can be skipped more easily than for example on
television, and classi￿ed advertising is more widespread. The assumption that
advertising does not have an impact on readers￿demand is also consistent with
Kaiser and Wright (2004)￿ s ￿ndings on the magazine market, which show a very
low signi￿cance of advertising shares in the equation for readers￿demand.
We assume therefore that the demand for advertising space is a function of
the size of the readership, whereas the demand for newspapers is independent of
advertising. In other words, we consider newspaper circulation as a complement
good with respect to advertising: other things being equal, when the price of a
newspaper increases, its readership decreases and therefore advertising demand
decreases as well.
4.1.1 Newspaper demand
We estimate a logit model of demand for di⁄erentiated products using the panel
data on the average daily number of copies printed in each weekday of each
month for Repubblica, Il Corriere della Sera, La Stampa, and Il Giornale.
The utility of consumer j from purchasing newspaper i at time t is a function




tively), cover price (pN
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where ￿ijt is an i.i.d. extreme-value distributed error term.
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where ￿i is a newspaper-speci￿c component and "it is an i.i.d. error term
varying across newspapers and time. The newspaper-speci￿c component ￿i is
assumed to be an unknown parameter speci￿c to each newspaper, which leads
to a ￿xed-e⁄ect model.
Consumers are assumed to purchase one unit of the good that gives them








9The implicit assumption, common to most empirical studies on di⁄erentiated product
markets, is that consumers purchase at most one product. This assumption seems reasonable
in the case of newspapers, where multiple purchases are likely to be negligible, especially if
the unit of analysis is the individual and not the household, as is the case here. Moreover,
subscriptions and corporate purchases of newspapers, which are typically multiple purchases,
are very low in Italy.
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it is the number of copies printed by newspaper i at time t relative
to the total market size. Market size is de￿ned as the total population in Italy
older than 14 years at time t:
The speci￿cation of the demand system is completed with the introduction
of an outside good, whose utility is generally normalized to zero, so that the







The estimation equation for the market share of newspaper i at time t is
obtained by taking logarithms and subtracting the log of the market share of
























The dependent variable is therefore the (log) market share of newspaper i
at time t relative to the market share of the outside good, which is calculated




Similarly to readers￿demand, we choose to adopt a logit speci￿cation also for
advertising demand. The assumptions behind the logit model might be stronger
in this context than they are in the context of readers￿demand. In particular
the assumption of single purchase could be more problematic when referred to
the purchase of advertising space than when it refers to readers￿choice, because
there might be advertisers who buy slots in more than one newspaper. However,
the alternative to the structural approach is a reduced-form approach, which suf-
fers from other drawbacks. For example, the solution proposed by Kaiser (2004)
is to model the advertising side with a behavioral equation, whereby advertising
rates are a function of past circulation. This methodology has the implication
that the link between the two sides of the market is only intertemporal, and
therefore the newspaper ￿rms has only one decision variable, i.e. cover price
(and not two as in our model). Therefore we decided to maintain the logit
assumption.
Adopting a logit speci￿cation also for the demand of advertising slots, the
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it is the number of advertising slots of newspaper i at time t relative
to the total market size. Total market size for advertising is de￿ned as the
market of daily publications.
The model takes into account the fact that the demand of advertising space
depends positively on the circulation of the newspaper yN
it , which in turn de-
pends on the vector of newspaper prices.











































4.2 The supply side
We assume that newspapers are price setters in both markets. We shall con-
sider two di⁄erent scenarios, one in which the industry is (oligopolistically)
competitive, and one in which it is collusive (joint pro￿t maximization). We
derive the pricing equations under the two hypotheses and the corresponding
formulas for the markups. We then substitute the estimated demand parame-
ters in the markup formulas. In this way we obtain four estimated markups:
one corresponding to a situation of oligopolistic competition in both markets,
one for joint pro￿t maximization in both markets, and two for the intermediate
cases (competition on the newspaper market and joint pro￿t maximization in
the advertising market; competition on the advertising market and joint pro￿t
maximization in the newspaper market). We can then compare the estimated
margins with the empirical margins in order to assess which is the right model
as in Nevo (2001).
4.2.1 Oligopolistic competition
We derive the pricing equation under the hypothesis that newspapers are com-
peting ￿ la Bertrand-Nash. Since the newspapers o⁄ered are di⁄erentiated, we
are in a framework of oligopolistic competition.
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￿i(pA
i ;pN
i ) = pN
i yN
i (pN) + pA
i yA




i is the price of newspaper i, yN
i is its demand, which depends on the
vector of newspapers prices pN. As to advertising revenues, pA
i is the price of
an advertising slot on newspaper i, and yA
i is the corresponding demand, which
depends on the vector of advertising prices pA and on the vector of readers￿
demands (which in turn depend on newspaper prices).
It is not possible from newspapers budgets to distinguish between costs of
newspapers and costs of advertising. There are probably ￿xed costs related
to the decision to advertise, for instance costs to print in color, but printing
an article or an advertising has probably the same cost. There might be an
advertising cost to consumers but we assumed there is no externality and also
in newspapers we might expect that also if advertising has a negative impact
on consumers it is less relevant than on other media such as television.
Each ￿rm chooses the prices for advertising and the newspaper which maxi-
mize pro￿ts, taking other ￿rms￿behavior as given. For each newspaper i, there
are two FOCs, one which determines the pricing equation for advertising and


























FOC(pN) The FOC with respect to pN is di⁄erent because it incorporates the
fact that the choice of the price of a newspaper has an impact not only on
the readership, but also on advertising revenues.
















































































10In what follows, we omit the t subscript to simpify notation.
12
Elena Argentesi and Lapo Filistrucchi
EUI WP ECO 2005/7Notice that the price-cost margin is lower than in the standard case exactly
because of the inter-market network e⁄ect: a change in cover price has
an e⁄ect on advertising revenues. This network e⁄ect is represented by
the two negative terms in the right-hand side of equation (16).11 The
￿rst negative term expresses the fact that a price increase decreases own
readership and therefore decreases own advertising demand. The last term
in the right-hand side of equation (16) represents instead the e⁄ect through
competitors: a price increase for newspaper i increases the readership of
rival newspapers, and has a negative e⁄ect on its advertising demand
through an impact on rivals￿advertising demand.
4.2.2 Joint pro￿t maximization
Suppose now that ￿rms collude (or jointly maximize pro￿ts). Each ￿rm i chooses
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The additional term on the right-hand side of equation (17) represents the
fact that under collusion, ￿rm i takes into account the impact that her
decisions have on other ￿rms￿pro￿ts, and therefore the price she sets is
higher than the one under competition.
















































11This term has the same interpretation of the ￿markup deterioration term￿described by
Kaiser (2004).
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This expression di⁄ers from (16) by the last term, which represents the
higher markup due to joint pro￿t maximization. Notice that also this last e⁄ect
is mitigated by the existence of a link with the other side of the market, and
therefore the markup is lower than in the standard collusive case.
5 The data
Our database on the market for newspapers in Italy mainly draws from the
data collected every year, from 1976 onwards, by the Accertamenti Di⁄usione
Stampa (ADS), which cover most national and local newspapers. ADS certi￿es
the validity of this information for advertising purposes. Newspapers are free
to choose whether to have their data certi￿ed or not, but if they choose so they
are obliged to provide all the information required and the truthfulness of the
reported information can be veri￿ed by the ADS. Most of the Italian newspapers
chose certi￿cation, some of them did not, or at least did so only discontinuously.
All in all, however, the data collected by ADS provide quite a complete picture
of the dynamics of the market in question for the last 27 years. The information
available for each newspaper includes, at various levels of time disaggregation,
data on sales, prints, gift copies, free subscriptions and paid subscriptions.
We restrict our analysis to the national newspapers of general information.
As motivated above, this market seems to be distinguishable both from the
market of business newspapers and from that of sport newspapers. Moreover,
the national newspapers of general information seem to belong to a di⁄erent
market than local newspapers, which mainly cover local news and are therefore
targeted to a di⁄erent kind of readership.
The database drawn from ADS ￿les has been completed with other useful
information, mainly obtained from newspaper publishers, such as the nominal
prices of the newspapers, the dates regular supplements were ￿rst enclosed, the
14
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and the dates of the opening of the newspapers web-sites.
In order to estimate a model of demand for daily newspapers, our ￿rst choice
would have been, of course, to use the average number of copies sold in Italy
in each month by newspapers agents or the number of paying subscriptions.
However, given our aim to estimate the price elasticity of demand and the
already discussed low variability of prices across newspapers, in the attempt
to enjoy a higher disaggregation of the data we chose to estimate a model of
the market by using data on average daily prints for each di⁄erent weekday in
each month. By doing so we could exploit the higher variation in the data,
particularly the variation in prices across weekdays within the same newspaper,
due to the presence of a supplement.
As to the data on advertising, we have information on yearly average adver-
tising quantity and revenues from 1992 to 2003 across all the daily newspapers
and across all the print market (newspapers and magazines). Besides these ag-
gregate data, we also have yearly data on advertising revenues for each daily
newspaper from 1988 to 2003.
As to advertising rates, we have the price list for di⁄erent types of advertising
slots for each of the four newspapers considered. These data are currently
available from 1990 to 2003. We are aware of the limitations of using price list
data in a ￿eld where discounts are a common practice, but this was the only
information we managed to obtain.12 Moreover, what matters for the sake of
the present analysis is that the potential bias between price list and actual prices
does not di⁄er too much across newspapers, which seems a plausible assumption.
In order to perform the estimation of the demand for advertising, we need
information on the advertising price and on advertising quantity for each news-
paper. The former information is contained in the price lists, whereas yearly
average advertising volumes are calculated using this information together with
individual advertising revenues.13 The assumption that allow us to derive adver-
tising quantities is that discount policies do not vary too much across newspapers
and over time.
We then use average advertising quantity across all the daily newspapers to
recover the share of the outside option, and we use it also to compute the average
advertising rate across all the daily newspapers (together with the information
on average advertising revenues).14
Another type of information that we use to estimate the demand for ad-
vertising is readership characteristics.15 For each newspaper, we include in the
12In fact, also price lists were not easy to obtain, because they are no longer published by
newspapers (we obtained them from a private source).
13In particular, advertising volumes are computed dividing advertising revenues by adver-
tising prices for each newspaper. This amounts to assuming that advertising discounts, if any,
are a percentage of the price.
14Alternatively, one could de￿ne the total potential market as the one for daily and non-
daily publications instead of the market for daily papers only, but the latter de￿nition seems
more consistent with the predominant approach to market de￿nition. See Argentesi and Ivaldi
(2004) for a discussion of market de￿nition in printed media industries.
15These data are available upon request from Audipress, an association which collects in-
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age of the readership for each newspaper.
Results for the two demand equations and for markup estimation are pre-
sented in the next section.
6 Estimation
In order to fully estimate the model described above, we have to estimate two
demand models, one for the advertising market and one for the circulation mar-
ket. We then use the estimated parameters to compute the price-cost margins
under the hypotheses of competition and collusion and then compare them with
the observed margins in order to assess which is the right model.
In order to estimate the markups, we need to estimate elasticities of readers￿
demand and advertising demand. We estimate both demand equations under a
multinomial logit speci￿cation.
We estimate a logit model for readers￿demand on a panel of the four major
newspapers of general information with monthly observation by weekday from
1976 to 2001. The vector of product characteristics includes dummies for the
issue of the weekly magazines that are sold together with the newspaper (both
a dummy for the weekday of issue and a dummy for their introduction which
is meant to capture a spillover e⁄ect16), dummies for the launch of websites,
a dummy for the games with prizes, the changes of editors, the issue of the
Monday edition, and dummies for other events like elections, sport events, and
months in order to deseasonalize the data. We also add a time trend in order
to control for a possible trend of growth of the whole market, or a general shift
in consumer tastes.
The residuals seem to be serially correlated, therefore we estimate a ￿xed
e⁄ect logit model with Newey-West standard errors. Therefore the error struc-
ture is assumed to be heteroskedastic and possibly autocorrelated up to 12 lags
(12 months).
Given that the data are monthly average printed copies by weekday for each
newspaper, the ￿xed e⁄ect is a newspaper-weekday ￿xed e⁄ect rather that a
newspaper ￿xed e⁄ect. This allows for a di⁄erent ranking of newspapers across
weekdays, which is very convenient when considering the impact of magazines
that are issued in di⁄erent days of the week by di⁄erent newspapers.17
Given the particular features of the daily newspapers market in Italy, which,
as further discussed below, has always been characterized by weak price com-
petition, we observe price variability across newspapers only in the presence of
supplements Identi￿cation of the price e⁄ect is then obtained by controlling for
formation on readership characteristics on the Italian printed media industry.
16The spillover e⁄ect is the e⁄ect of the introduction of supplements on other weekdays as
well.
17Notice that the vector of ￿xed e⁄ects ￿ is identi￿ed separately from the coe¢ cients on
characteristics because in our framework the latter are time-variant (see Berry, 1994 p. 256
and Kaiser, 2003).
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does not change over time.
Notice that price endogeneity is not a big concern in this framework because
prices were regulated until the end of the Eighties and even afterwards there
was not much variability in nominal prices across newspapers and over time, so
we can reasonably assume that prices are at least predetermined.
The estimation results for readers￿demand are presented in Table 1 in the
Appendix.
The price coe¢ cient is negative: estimated own elasticities are around 0.48.18
Cross elasticities are estimated in a range from 0.008 (Corriere della Sera) to
0.002 (Il Giornale). These estimates of elasticities are consistent with previous
studies: for example, Bucklin, Caves and Lo (1989) estimate own elasticities
which range from 0.26 to 0.55, whereas Dertouzos and Trautman (1990)￿ s esti-
mates are around 0.44.
The other coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are very precisely esti-
mated. The coe¢ cient for the day of issue of the magazine of general infor-
mation is positive and strongly signi￿cant. The fact that the coe¢ cient of the
dummy for the introduction of the magazine of general information is positive
and signi￿cant in both regressions suggests that the supplements had an im-
pact not only on the day of the week in which they are issued, but also on the
other days, which can be seen as a spillover e⁄ect. Our estimates show that
lottery games that were introduced by some newspapers in the Nineties seem
to have been very successful. Another interesting result concerns the launch
of websites, which seems to have a negative impact on printed newspapers.19
This result contrasts with those of Kaiser (2003), who ￿nds that there is no
signi￿cant crowding out by the online version in the German market for women
magazines. This di⁄erence can partly be explained with the fact that in Italy
the online version was very similar to the printed one, which was not the case
for German women magazines. Our ￿ndings can also explain the fact that, after
a period where the online version was free-of-charge, some newspapers (namely
those whose websites were more successful) started to charge readers for online
access to full content.
We estimate the demand for advertising space under the speci￿cation dis-
cussed at the end of the last section. We estimate advertising demand on a
panel of newspaper with annual data from 1992 to 2003. As explanatory vari-
ables for advertising demand we include advertising rates, newspaper￿ s sales,
the readers￿average age and the share of male readers. There is a potential en-
dogeneity problem to be discussed, concerning both newspaper circulation and
advertising rates. Given our claim that cover prices are exogenous (or at least
predetermined) in the readers￿demand equation, then the size of the reader-
ship should not be endogenous in the advertising demand equation. However,
advertising rates are likely to be endogenously determined, and should there-
fore be instrumented. We use the (average) characteristics of other ￿rms as
18Elasticity estimates are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix.
19Filistrucchi (2003) analyses the impact of website provision on printed newspapers on the
same dataset that we use here.
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of product di⁄erentiation.20 These are appropriate instruments because they
are correlated with price through the condition for pro￿t maximization, but are
assumed to be exogenous to the single ￿rm decision.21
Results of this estimation are shown in Table 3. The price parameter is
negative and signi￿cant, albeit very small. Newspaper circulation is positive,
which con￿rms the existing link with the readers market. The demand for
advertising space seems to be negatively correlated with readers￿age and with
the share of male readers.
Results for the estimated markups are reported in Table 4. The ￿gures in
Table 4 are average (from 1997 to 2001) markups on advertising rates and on
cover prices under the four alternative hypotheses of competition: (oligopolis-
tic competition) in both markets, joint pro￿t maximization in both markets,
competition on the newspaper market but joint pro￿t maximization in the ad-
vertising market, and competition on the advertising market but joint pro￿t
maximization in the newspaper market. Both cover price markup and adver-
tising price markup are reported. Total markup is the sum of the two markups
(where advertising markup has been transformed in per copy terms rather than
per advertising slot).22
An interesting feature of the estimated markups is that, given our observed
quantities, joint pro￿t maximization in the advertising market seems to give a
lower total markup than oligopolistic competition. In Appendix B we derive
the conditions under which this situation may arise. This feature is another
consequence of the two-sided nature of this market. To give the intuition of
why this situation can arise, let us consider the case where there is competition
in the readers￿market23 and compare the total markup under the two alternative
hypotheses on the advertising market, namely competition and collusion, for a
given level of prices and quantities.24 In this situation, if ￿rms were colluding
in the advertising market, advertising prices will be higher than if ￿rms were
competing. This in turn means that advertising quantity will tend to be lower.
Given the link between the two sides of the market, in order to keep advertising
quantity unaltered the ￿rm can increase the readership (which has the o⁄setting
e⁄ect of raising the advertising quantity). But this can be done only by lowering
cover price, which implies a lower markup on the cover price. If the lower
20See for example Berry (1994) and Nevo (2001).
21We have also tried to use other possible instruments for advertising prices like the whole-
sale price of paper and the number of complimentary copies distributed by each newspapers
(which could be seen as a cost of attracting advertising and therefore correlated with adver-
tising price). However these alternative instruments do not seem to perform very well.
22Notice that there are only two relevant markups for advertising rates (one for the compet-
itive case and one for the collusive case) because advertising markups do not depend on cover
price given our assumption that the externality is one-sided. We have instead four relevant
cover price markups because these markups depend on the advertising market.
23As we show in Appendix B, the same logic applies to the case where there is collusion in
the readers￿market.
24This quali￿cation is important because we are not saying that collusion always gives a
lower markup than competition, but rather that, given the observed quantity levels, the ￿rm
would get higher pro￿ts in a competitive situation than in a collusive one.
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respect to the case of competition in advertising), then the total markup under
collusion (in advertising) is lower than the total markup under competition (in
advertising).25 The intuition lies therefore in the network e⁄ect that links the
two sides of the market, and in particular on the impact that advertising has
on cover price markup.
From the balance data that we have, we have computed the (average) total
markup per copy for the category of newspapers that we are considering, which
is 0.943 Euro. We compare this observed markup with the estimated ones in
order to assess which model of competition better ￿ts reality. Given that in the
advertising market joint pro￿t maximization is dominated by competition for
the reason explained above, the two relevant estimated markups are the ￿rst
one (competition in both markets) and the third one (joint pro￿t maximization
in the newspaper market and competition in the advertising market) in Table
4 (in bold in the table). The observed markup falls within the 90% con￿dence
interval (computed by bootstrap)26 of the estimated markup that ￿rms would
obtain if they were jointly maximizing pro￿ts in the newspaper market, whereas
it falls out of the con￿dence interval of the estimated markup under competition
in the newspaper market. This seems to show that the hypothesis that there
exist some collusion cannot be rejected by the data. Indeed our results suggest
that there might be some collusion on cover price and a competitive behavior
on the advertising side. This seems to be consistent with the pattern of cover
prices and with the impression that newspapers are not competing so much
along the price dimension. On the other hand, the advertising market seems
to be much more competitive due also to the competitive pressure from other
media. Indeed, advertising rates are subject to a lot of discounting and are not
easily observable by competitors, a factor which probably makes collusion more
di¢ cult to sustain.
7 Conclusions
We address the issue of measuring market power in a two-sided market with
an application to the Italian newspaper market. Using an original dataset on
Italian newspapers, we estimate the demand on the two sides of this market,
namely the readers￿side and the advertising side. We also model the supply side
and derive the hypothetical markups under two alternative conjectures about
newspapers￿behavior, namely a competitive behavior and a collusive behavior.
The comparison between the estimated markups and the observed markups
shows some evidence of joint pro￿t maximization on the newspaper cover price,
whereas the advertising market is closer to competition, which is consistent with
25The explicit condition under which this is the case is derived in Appendix B and essentially
depends on the magnitude of the network e⁄ect and on the price sensitivity of newspaper
demand.
26The con￿dence intervals are computed with the normal, the bias-corrected, and the per-
centile methods.
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One possible direction for further research could be to extend the theoret-
ical model in order to account for the possibility of a two-sided externality,
namely when readers care about advertising. This would also allow us to esti-
mate readers￿taste for advertising, which is something that has received little
attention in the empirical literature. Since this type of analysis would require
a simultaneous estimation of the two demand systems, it would probably be
hard to implement it with our current dataset, because we only have yearly
data available for the advertising market whereas we have monthly data for
on the readers￿side. Therefore this exercise would require a larger dataset on
advertising demand.
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Figure 1: Monthly averages of daily printed copies
Figure 2: Newspapers￿cover prices (in ITL)
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EUI WP ECO 2005/7Figure 3: Advertising volumes.
Figure 4: Nominal prices per advertising slot (in ITL).
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Logit ￿xed e⁄ects
Real cover price - 0.0004***
(0.000)




Own women supplement (day) 0.243***
(0.019)
Own women supplement 0.030*
(0.017)






N. of obs. 8417
N. of groups 28
Note: The dependent variable is log market shares of circulation (see equa-
tions (6)). Standard errors are in parentheses. Other control variables are
included in the regression, such as dummies for sport events, elections, change
of editors etc.
Table 2: Own and cross demand elasticities for readers￿demand
Corriere Repubblica Stampa Giornale
Corriere -0.4855 0.0082 0.0082 0.0082
Repubblica 0.0070 -0.4919 0.0070 0.0070
Stampa 0.0054 0.0054 -0.4734 0.0054
Giornale 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 -0.4712
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Coe¢ cient Standard error
Advertising rates -7.19e-07*** 1.18e-07
Newspaper￿ s sales 2.57e-06*** 2.30e-07
Male readers -.0552*** .0121
Readers￿age -.0966*** .0151
Constant .7347
N. of obs 44
Note: The dependent variable is log market shares of advertising for each
newspaper (see equation (7)). Instrumental variable: sum of other newspapers￿
characteristics.
Table 4: Estimated markups
Advertising markup Cover price markup Est. markup (total)
Comp(N)-Comp(A) .603 .226 .829 (.062)
Comp(N)-Coll(A) .611 .210 .822 (.062)
Coll(N)-Comp(A) .603 .293 .896 (.065)
Coll(N)-Coll(A) .611 .278 .889 (.065)
Note: Markups are expressed in Euro. ￿Comp (N)-Coll(A)￿indicates the
case where the newspaper market is competitive and the advertising market is
collusive, and similarly for the other cases. Bootstrapped standard errors are in
parentheses.
9 Appendix B: Comparison of markups
9.1 Case competition-collusion vs competition-competition
We want to explore the conditions under which, given the observed prices and
quantities, joint pro￿t maximization in the advertising market might give a lower
(total) markup than oligopolistic competition. We then compare the markup
obtained in the case where there is competition in the readers￿ market and
collusion in the advertising market with the markup obtained under competition
in both markets, for a given level of prices and quantities.
9.1.1 Markup competition-collusion
We write the total markup in the case where ￿rms compete in the readers￿
market but collude in the advertising market.
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We write the total markup when ￿rms compete in both markets.
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i ￿ cA
i ) (which is a di⁄erent term



























































































Simplifying we get the following condition which tells us when the markup







































which means that if the network e⁄ect is relatively high (the LHS is the
aggregate elasticity of yA
i with respect to pN
i ), then, given the observed quanti-
ties, joint pro￿t maximization in advertising market gives a lower markup than
competition in advertising market, because it implies lowering a lot the cover
price markup.
On the other hand if readers￿demand elasticity is relatively high, it means
that cover price markup is relatively low, and therefore it is worthwhile sacri-
￿cing cover price markup to the advantage of advertising markup by colluding
in the advertising market.
9.2 Case collusion-collusion vs collusion-competition
Let us now investigate whether the same logic works in the case where ￿rms col-
lude in the readers￿market. We then want to compare the relative pro￿tability
of colluding in the advertising market with respect to competition.
9.2.1 Markup collusion-collusion
We write the total markup in the case where ￿rms collude in both markets.
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We write the total markup when ￿rms collude in the readers￿market but com-
pete in the advertising market.
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simpli￿es from both sides of the inequality, and therefore the condition for which
collusion dominates competition in the advertising side is the same as in the
previous case.
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